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resumen
El artículo compara dos concepciones de la historiografía de la ética en la tradi-
ción aristotélica. En primer lugar se intenta dar una explicación de “historiografía de 
la ética “y de “tradición aristotélica“. Luego se explican las diferencias entre las ideas 
historiográficas de dos de los más ilustres teóricos en este campo: MacIntyre e Irwin. 
Para explicar la posición de MacIntyre, se empieza con A Short History of Ethics and se 
concluye con God, Philosophy, Universities. Para analizar el pensamiento de Irwin se 
toma en consideración The Development of Ethics.
Sostengo que MacIntyre e Irwin conciben la Historia de la ética como el desarrollo 
de una subdisciplina de la Filosofía llamada ética. A través de la exposición se expli-
can los orígenes de la tradición aristotélica desde Sócrates a Aristóteles, y cómo San 
Agustín, Santo Tomás y Suárez tienen un diferente rol en las concepciones de MacIntyre 
y de Irwin. Finalmente, los argumentos tomistas de MacIntyre y los neo-aristotélicos de 
Irwin son comparados durante la época moderna y contemporánea. El artículo concluye 
explicando algunas similitudes entre ambos filósofos para construir una Historiografía 
general de la ética. 
Palabras clave: Ética, Historiografía, Tradición Aristotélica.
* I am indebt to Prof. Alasdair MacIntyre, Prof. Terence Irwin, Dr. Kelvin Knight, Prof. Josep M. 
Vilajosana and Prof. Josep-Ignasi Saranyana for their careful help.
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abstraCt
MacIntyre, Irwin This paper compares two conceptions of Ethical Historiography 
in the Aristotelian Tradition. First of all, it provides definitions of “Historiography of 
Ethics” and “Aristotelian Tradition”. Then it goes on to explain the differences between 
the historiographical ideas of the leading philosophers in this area: MacIntyre and Irwin. 
To explain the conception of MacIntyre, it starts with A Short History of Ethics and fin-
ish with his God, Philosophy, Universities. In order to comment on Irwin’s thought, it 
analyses his lenthy masterpiece The Development of Ethics.
I claim MacIntyre and Irwin conceive History of Ethics as the development of the 
sub-discipline of Philosophy called Ethics. Throughout the exposition it explains the 
origins of the Aristotelian tradition (from Socrates to Aristotle) and how in Stoicism 
Augustine, Aquinas and Suárez have a diferent role in MacIntyre’s and in Irwin’s ap-
proaches. Finally, the Thomistic arguments of MacIntyre and the Neo-Aristotelian claim 
of Irwin are compared throughout the Middle Ages and the Modern Era. The paper 
concludes by explaining some resemblances between the two philosophers in order to 
construct a general “Historiography of Ethics”.
Key words: Ethics, Historiography, Aristotelian Tradition, MacIntyre, Irwin.
In this article I will compare two conceptions of Ethical Historiography in 
the Aristotelian Tradition in Europe. First of all, I will define “Historiography 
of Ethics” and the “Aristotelian Tradition”. Then I will go on to explain the dif-
ferences between the ideas of two prominent philosophers in this area: MacIn-
tyre and Irwin. In order to explain the conception of MacIntyre I start with his 
A Short History of Ethics1 and finish with his God, Philosophy, Universities2, 
while in order to comment on Irwin’s thought I will analyze only his lenthy 
masterpiece The Development of Ethics3.
1  a.	maCintyre, A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric 
Age to the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. Indiana, 1998.
2  a.	maCintyre, God, Philosophy, Universities. A Selective History of Catholic Philosophical 
Tradition, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.
3  T.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007-2009, I (From 
Socrates to the Reformation), II (From Suárez to Rousseau), III (From Kant to Rawls). A long review 
article about three volumes is r.	ramis-barCeló, “La historia de la ética (y del derecho natural) según 
Terence Irwin”, en Pensamiento, 67 (2011), 347-365.
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I. HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ETHICS
Furay and Salevouris define historiography as “the study of the way history 
has been and is written”4. Historiography of Ethics may be understood in four 
ways: first, as the study of the history of the sub-discipline of history, known as 
the “History of Ethics”, including its disciplinary methods and theories and also 
the study of its own historical development; second, as the reading that ethicists 
perform on their own history, in relation to general history; third, as the his-
tory of the development of the sub-discipline of Philosophy called Ethics, and 
finally the reading that ethicists carry out of their own history, independently of 
the general History or of Philosophy.
While many possibile definitions exist, in my view there are only two 
appropriate understandings of “Historiography of Ethics”: the second and the 
third options. The second is a History of Ethics written according to cultural 
background of each period. Irwin calls it ‘Cantabrigian History’5 and J. B. 
Schneewind is perhaps the most distinguished representive of this sort of view.
I claim that MacIntyre and Irwin conceive the History of Ethics as the 
development of the sub-discipline of Philosophy called Ethics. They do not 
avoid the cultural influences of each period, but rather concentrate their his-
torical research on a dialogue between Ethics and the rest of Philosophy. In his 
entry “Histories of Moral Philosophy”, MacIntyre (according to Irwin) explains 
the relationship between Ethics and Theoretical Philosophy (Psychology, Soci-
ology, Epistemology, Metaphysics, and so on as follows.)
Recent work on the history of moral philosophy has raised more sharply than 
ever before the question whether it can be adequately narrated in independence 
of the history of philosophy in general and there is strong evidence to be cited 
on both sides of the question. T. H. Irwin in Aristotle’s First Principles (Oxford, 
1988) has presented an account of Aristotle’s arguments and theses about the 
good, the virtues, and political association, according to which those arguments 
and theses are underpinned by and need to be made intelligible in terms of Aris-
totle’s metaphysical and psychological conclusions6.
The first work that the History of Ethics covered as a part of the History of 
Philosophy was Lessons on the History of Philosophy by Hegel. In this work, 
Hegel describes the evolution of Ethics as part of the History of Philosophy. But 
from that moment onward Ethics did not form part of the History of Philosophy 
4  C.	Furay	-	m.	J.	salevouris, The Methods and Skills of History: A Practical Guide, Arling-
ton Heights, Ill. Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1988, 223.
5  t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, o. c., 10.
6 	a.	maCintyre, “Histories of Moral Philosophy”, en t.	HonderiCH (ed.), The Oxford Com-
panion to Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, 356-360.
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because each part of Philosophy starts independently. From Hume to Moore, 
Ethics -as a sphere of knowledge- lost its traditional links with Theoretical 
Philosophy. Hume claimed that from “ought” it is not possible to derive “is”’, 
and Kant separated with extreme clarity the spheres of knowledge and decision. 
Indeed, Ethics in the 18th Century attained an important level of autonomy7, but 
its roots and relations with metaphysics and epistemology disappeared. 
The most important reference in “Historiography of Ethics” throughout the 
19th and 20th centuries was Sidgwick because he studied Ethics historically and 
systematically with a view independent from epistemology and metaphysics. 
Sidgwick provided the methodology and the main points in the History of 
Ethics. Outlines of the history of ethics for English readers8 by Sidgwick was, 
in fact, the hallmark historiographical reference for English scholars, but its 
influence was not very deep in the first half of 20th Century due to the fact that 
the analytic movement cancelled out the historical influence in ethical thought. 
The following paragraph by Schneewind is useful here:
For Sidgwick, one point of the function of the historiography of ethics was to 
show that there really was -that there always had been- the discipline of moral 
philosophy; it therefore should have a secure place in the curriculum. Today, I 
think, we need a different service from study of the history of moral philosophy. 
We need it to show us how moral philosophy at different times has served dif-
ferent practical purposes. Historicizing the past of the discipline raises questions 
about what is being done now. Is the debate about deontology, consequential-
ism, and now virtue ethics still worth continuing? Or are there other issues that 
might well be addressed? Can moral philosophy address the larger issues of the 
time? Or is it at best part of the training for the new casuistry of applied ethics?9
The Historiography of Ethics has changed deeply over the past fifty years, 
but the analytic approach to Ethics from Moore to Hare did not modify the 
conception of History of Ethics that was established at the end of 19th Century. 
In the prevailing collective view, the historiographical works by Sidgwick and 
neohegelians kept their places in the canonic conception of the “History of 
Ethics”. It is possible to say that in 1960 there was no need to update the His-
toriography of Ethics, because the analytic philosophy had shown as that it was 
impossible to understand “the language of morals10” and according to “natural-
istic fallacy” all philosophers from Greece to 20th Century were misguided. The 
7  J.	b.	sCHneewind, The Invention of Autonomy. A History of Modern Moral Philosophy, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
8  H.	sidGwiCk, Outlines of the history of ethics for English readers, London, Macmillan, 1886.
9  J.	b.	sCHneewind, “Teaching the History of Moral Philosophy”, en Essays on the History of 
Moral Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, 144.
10  r.	m.	Hare, The Language of Morals, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
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“History of Ethics” was the story of a mistake, the development of a general 
confusion that reigned until recent times.
Certainly, the “History of Ethics” was an abandoned topic in British and 
Scottish philosophy from Bradley and Green to MacIntyre. In fact, MacIntyre 
was able to take his place as the rebuilder of the “Historiography of Ethics” in 
1966 precisely because nobody cultived it. Utilitarians, emotivists or prescrip-
tivists considered that the basis of correct Ethics (without “naturalistic fallacy”) 
was from Hume onwards. MacIntyre reconstructed Historiography in two 
ways: first of all, he did so by destroying the “naturalistic fallacy” and showing 
that Hume sometimes incurred in it11; and secondly, MacIntyre illustrated that 
“the good’ had in fact been defined in Greece from Homer to Aristotle12. For a 
contemporary reader, A Short History of Ethics seems to be a very repetitive 
book, insisting on the definition of “the good”. Nevertheless, MacIntyre aims to 
find a thearapy against Moorean interpretation.
In all likelihood A Short History of Ethics presents one of the two most 
important claims for the rehabilitation of practical reason. It embodies the recu-
peration of the History of Ethics connecting Greeks with Moderns. The other 
claim was made in A Theory of Justice by John Rawls, the author with whom 
Irwin concludes The Development of Ethics. These authors represent the con-
temporary roots of the Historiography of Ethics.
II. ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION
MacIntyre and Irwin defended that “Historiography of Ethics” is con-
tained within a historical sub-discipline of Ethics, and that it is, at the same 
time, a sub-discipline of Philosophy. During the 19th and 20th centuries Ethics 
was divorced from Epistemology and Metaphysics. For this reason, it was an 
ahistorical and antitheoretical discipline, dominated by sentiments, desires 
or imperatives. There were no reasons for action, and the connexion between 
knowledge and decision failed.
11  See	a.	maCintyre, “Hume on «is» and «ought»”, en Against the Self-Images of the Age: 
Essays on Ideology and Philosophy, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1978, 113. “His work is 
full of anthropological and sociological remarks, remarks sometimes ascribed by commentators to the 
confusion between logic and psychology with which Hume is so often credited. Whether Hume is in 
general guilty of this confusion is outside the scope of this paper to discuss. But so far as his moral the-
ory is concerned, the sociological comments have a necessary place in the whole structure of argument. 
Consider, for example, Hume’s account of justice. To call an act ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ is to say that it falls 
under a rule. A single act of justice may well be contrary to either private or public interest or both”.
12 	a.	maCintyre, A Short History of Ethics, o.c., 3-12.
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MacIntyre and Irwin return to Greece in order to show that from Homer 
to Aristotle, Biology, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Psychology and Ethics were 
connected, and that there are reasons for action. Both contemporary professors 
conceive that a complete Historiography of Ethics starts in Greece and that 
therein can be found the seeds of the European Tradition. In fact, their view 
emphazises that from Homer to Aristotle a tradition was formed and the Mac-
edonian philosopher reprsents the climax of this historical development.
MacIntyre starts with Homer, involving the epic poetry in the origins of 
Ethics. Irwin, following Vlastos13, considers that Western Ethics began with 
Socrates14. In fact, The Development of Ethics provides a broader analysis of 
Socratic Ethics and can be divided into two main topics: first of all, a formal 
claim is presented to show how Ethics is cultivated according to a dialectical 
debate; secondly, a material thesis is laid out, showing that the complete goal of 
Philosophy is to provide reasons for acting and reaching happiness.
It is obvious that both assertions are recognised by Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle. For MacIntyre and Irwin, these three philosophers are members of 
the same tradition. In Ethics, the main differences between Plato and his disci-
ple are minimal if, for example, we compare them in both Epistemology or in 
Aesthetics15. From Jaeger onwards, most relevant Aristotelians recognise the 
continuity of Ethics between Plato and Aristotle: Düring, Berti or Couloubarit-
sis follow this line of thinking.
Two claims of Socratic Ethics are formulated and improved in the classical 
expositions of Aristotle, mainly the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle clarified the 
status of Ethics and its connections with Biology, Epistemology, Metaphysics, 
Psychology, as Irwin shows in his Aristotle’s First Principles16, and MacIntyre 
obviously accepts this argumentation17. In his defence of Aristotelianism, Irwin 
enforces Naturalism as the main characteristic of Aristotelian tradition. 
Aristotle, by linking Biology and Psychology to Theoretical and Practical 
Philosophy, laid the foundation for his thinking on Naturalism, thus making his 
13  G.	vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1991, 200-232. 
14  t.	 irwin, Plato’s Ethics, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995, 75. “He [Socrates] 
claims that since he wants to be as virtuous as he can be and has no desire for anything that conflicts 
with being virtuous, he suffers no loss of happiness, and hence no harm, if he loses any of the supposed 
‘goods’ that the virtuous person has to forgo. Socrates might also fairly claim that the virtuous person 
is less liable to frustrated desire than a non-virtuous person, since a non-virtuous person is liable to 
failures that do not affect a virtuous person”.
15  See i.	dürinG, Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens, Heidelberg, 
1966.
16 	t.	irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988.
17  a.	maCintyre, “Histories of Moral Philosophy”, en The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 
o.c., 359.
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Ethics cognoscitive, objective and rational. This justifies the reality of a group 
of basic goods which provides for the consequence of happiness and the exist-
ence of a Natural Law in order to protect these goods in human societies. It is 
then a teleological approach, one which develops Ethics based on natural incli-
nations of human beings. 
So far we have defined “Aristotelian”, that it is only a part of the termi-
nology we are using. The other part is “Tradition”, which was studied in great 
detail by MacIntyre and Irwin. In the 1970’s, MacIntyre claimed that traditions 
were inadequate, but in the late 1980’s the issues making them inadequate were 
remedied by solving the problems of other traditions18. In the 1990’s Irwin 
makes use of the same sense of tradition that he employs in his The Develop-
ment of Ethics. Both philosophers are engaged with the Aristotelian tradition19.
In After Virtue, MacIntyre is Aristotelian; he does not embrace Thomism. 
The attributes of his Aristotelianism are essentially the cognoscitivism of the 
good and the importance of it for the reasons of action. Irwin agrees with this 
vision and explains the basic elements of the Aristotelian Tradition, highlight-
ing the importance of Naturalism and the teleological importance of eudaimo-
nia20. 
MacIntyre and Irwin are of the same mind in regarding the roots of the 
Aristotelian Tradition and the projection of these roots to the Middle Ages. 
18 	a.	maCintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 
Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1988, 12. “A Tradition is an argument extended through 
time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of 
conflict: those with critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at least key parts of 
those fundamental agreements, and those internal, interpretative debates through which the meaning 
and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be expressed and whose progress a tradition is 
constituted”.
19  a.	maCintyre, After Virtue, o.c., 59. “Within the Aristotelian tradition to call x good (…) is 
to say that it is the kind of x which someone would choose who wanted an x for the purpose for which 
x’s are characteristically wanted. To call a watch good is to say that it is the kind of watch which some-
one would choose who wanted a watch to keep time accurately (rather than, say, to throw at a cat). 
The presupposition of this use of ‘good’ is that every type of item which it is appropriate to call good 
or bad - including persons and actions - has, as a matter of fact, some given purpose or function. To 
call something good therefore is also to make a factual statement. (…) Within this tradition moral and 
evaluative statements can be called true or false in precisely the way in which all other factual state-
ments can be so called”.
20  t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, I, o.c., 4. “[Aristotle] defends an account of the human 
good as happiness (eudaimonia), consisting in the fulfilment of human nature, expressed in the various 
human virtues. His position is teleological, in so far as it seeks the basic guide for action in an ultimate 
end, eudaemonist, in so far as it identifies the ultimate end with happiness, and naturalist, in so far as 
it identifies virtue and happiness in a life that fulfils the nature and capacities of rational human nature. 
This is the position that I describe as ‘Aristotelian Naturalism’, or ‘traditional Naturalism’. We can fol-
low one significant thread through the history of moral philosophy by considering how far Aristotle is 
right, and what his successors think about his claims”.
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Aquinas is seen as the climax of this Tradition because he is able to join Agus-
tinian Christianism with the legacy of Aristotle. Nevertheless, some differences 
are relevant when comparing Irwin and MacIntyre. In the following pages I 
will concentrate on historiographical disagreements.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CLAIM
The main difference between MacIntyre and Irwin is that the former is 
antimodern and the latter understands certain Modernity as a projection of the 
Aristotelian tradition. Both authors basically agree on matters from Aristotle 
to Aquinas as is shown in their acceptance of the Platonic and/or Aristote-
lian agreement on Stoicism and on Augustine. Plato and Aristotle are both 
rationalists and Socratics, and the differences between them are conveniently 
overlooked. Aristotle subsumes the rationalism and the idealism of Plato, and 
this Naturalism emphasises the most distinguished explanation of the Socratic 
tradition. Aquinas represents the pinnacle of the Aristotelian tradition for his 
addition of Christian virtues to the Pagan elements of Aristotle.
For Irwin, the Aristotelian Tradition is understood as an apology of ration-
ality and prudence against sentimentalism, voluntarism and scepticism. Irwin 
speaks of the Aristotelian Tradition (if I can reformulate Popper’s title) as “The 
Rationalism and its Enemies”. It is also clear that, categorically speaking, Sto-
ics are rationalists21, while Epicureans are voluntarists and sentimentalists. 
Augustine throughout the Reformation has been understood as the source of 
some voluntarist interpretations and Irwin enforces this rational dimension22.
MacIntyre did not place any importance on the Medieval Era in his A Short 
History of Ethics, but his recent books have corrected this notion by presenting 
21 	t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, I, o. c., 308: “[Aristotle] argues that rational agents are 
rightly held responsible for their voluntary actions because these are actions of agents who are capable 
of rational deliberation and election. The Stoics go further, and insist that we are responsible for those 
actions that actually express – either by reflexion on appearances or by simply going along with them 
– the outlook that is embodied in the agent’s elections (as Aristotle understands them). This further 
element in the Stoic position modifies and develops Aristotle, but it does not depart sharply from his 
position. Later expositors of Aristotle’s position are right, therefore, to mention assent”.
22 	t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, I, o. c., 412: “We have no reason, therefore, to attribute 
voluntarism to Augustine. He emphasizes the role of the will in free and responsible action because he 
believes that non-rational desires can move us to free action only with our consent; he does not claim 
that the will moves us independently of the greater apparent good. He accepts Stoic intellectualism 
and avoids voluntarism” […] “The will is free in relation to the passions in so far as it is capable of 
consenting or not consenting to the actions suggested by the passions. The will is not similarly free in 
relation to the apparent good, but Augustine does not suggest that this lack of freedom involves any 
lack of the freedom relevant to responsibility”.
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Thomism as his ideological option23. For Irwin, Aquinas considerably enriched 
the Aristotelian legacy and improved on Aristotle24 as well; MacIntyre also 
agrees on this. The difference between the Northern Irish and the Scottish phi-
losophers is that the former understands Aquinas as a progression from Aristo-
tle, but Aquinas does not represent the best historical conception, as MacIntyre 
argues25.
This is, perhaps, the first difference: for Irwin the Development of Ethics 
is dialectical and comprehensive and Aquinas represents an improvement in the 
Aristotelian legacy, but not the pinnacle. He views Aquinas as one of the high-
est points in their tradition, but certain philosophical problems changed and the 
Aristotelian legacy continued to be focused on voluntarianism. For MacIntyre, 
on the other hand, Aquinas is the best source of Aristotelian tradition and pro-
vided great enrichment to the philosophy of Aristotle26; the rest of the members 
of this tradition are not equally rich and thoughtful. 
Both professors are of the same mind in their rejection of Fransciscanism. 
Scotus and Ockham represent the explosion of voluntarianism in the face of 
Aquinas’ rationality. Luther was critized by Irwin as an advocate of Franciscan-
ism irrationality (but not as an Agustinian). Neither Machiavelli or the other 
philosophers of the Renaissance are given any importance in The Development 
of Ethics because their attacks against Aristotle and Aquinas were unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, in the Renaissance and the rest of the Modern Era there is a 
cluster of ways (sentimentalism, egoism, rationality, scepticism, etc.) that have 
strong connections among them from the end of the Scholastic period to Kant. 
Schneewind illustrates this in his The Invention of Autonomy, the contextual-
ist History of Ethics that finally points to Kant as the end and culmination of 
Modernity.
23  See a.	maCintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, passim, Three Rival Versions of 
Moral Enquiry. Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and Tradition, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 
1990; and God, Philosophy, Universities. A Selective History of Catholic Tradition, Maryland, Row-
man & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.
24  t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, I, o. c., 642-652.
25  See also a.	maCintyre, Dependent Rational Animals, Why Human Beings Need the Vir-
tues?, Illinois, Open Court, Chicago and La Salle, 1999.
26 	a.	maCintyre, “Nietzsche or Aristotle?”, en The American Philosopher: Conversations 
with Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, MacIntyre, and Kuhn, interviewed by G. 
Borradori Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, 264-265. “It is in these terms that Aristotelian-
ism failed with respect to key parts of its physics and biology, but succeeded in vindicating itself ratio-
nally as metaphysics, as politics and morals, and as a theory of inquiry. If this is so, then Aristotelian-
ism has been shown in at least these areas to be not only the best theory so far, but the best theory so far 
about what makes a particular theory the best one. At this point, it is rational to proceed in philosophy 
as an Aristotelian, until and unless reasons are provided for doing otherwise”.
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During the Modern Era MacIntyre points to two significant ways of thinking: 
first of all, the study of Aristotelianism (basically in Whose Justice? Which Ra-
tionality?) and later the synthesis of the Catholic tradition (in God, Philosophy, 
Universities). Within this tradition, there are two different lines of reasoning: on 
the one hand, the study of Aristotelian Naturalism, and on the other hand, the 
development of Thomism in the Catholic tradition.
In Whose Justice? Which Rationality? a continuity from Aquinas to Hume 
can be seen, showing the agreement of Hutcheson, Stair and Hume with the 
Aristotelian tradition. What exactly is this agreeement? A considerable num-
bers of contributors to the Scottish Enlightenment were educated in the Aristo-
telian tradition and accepted that human beings had antecedents for action such 
as sentiments, passions or reasons that motivated their action. Nevertheless, 
around 1780 the Aristotelian Psychology and Anthropology were transformed 
into a trascendental and abstract conception, and from then onwards the deci-
sions of human beings were deemed not to have any antecedent27.
The change started to take place with Hume, Reid and Kant. While Hume 
represents the last of Aristotelians describing human beings as animals with 
passions, sentiments or desires, Reid and Kant portrayed man as a trascendental 
being who does not have any antecedent of action but only trascendental imper-
atives. For MacIntyre, Kant’s Anthropology is the opposite of the Aristotelian 
outlook because it is not based on the nature of human beings, but on a trascen-
dental idea. Therefore, the MacIntyre’s first historiographical claim reveals a 
continuity from Aquinas to the Scottish Enlightenment and a deep break taking 
place around 178028.
Let us now turn to the development of Catholic Tradition. MacIntyre 
explains its rise through the continuity or discontinuity of Thomism through-
out Modernity. The philosopher exhibits a critical view of the Modern Era and 
Modernity because of the Roman Catholic Church’s abandonment of Thomism 
and the ensuing “divorce” between Philosophy and Theology. Thus, MacIntyre 
describes a continuity from Aquinas to the Spanish Scholastics, the subsequent 
decadence and later the period from Descartes, Arnauld and the like to the 
Neothomism of Newmann and of Pope Leo XIII29.
Comparing the two alternative viewpoints, it is clear that MacIntyre con-
siders that there was a fracture in the Modern Era with Aristotelianism and with 
Thomism. Aristotelianism ends when the trascendental philosophy starts and 
27 a.	maCintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, chapter XVI.
28 	a.	maCintyre, “How Moral Agents Became Ghosts: Or Why the History of Ethics Di-
verged from that of the Philosophy of Mind”, en Synthèse, 53 (1982), 295.
29  a.	maCintyre, God, Philosophy, Universities, 105 ss.
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Thomism concludes primarly after the Spanish Scholastics and Descartes, and 
it reappears in the 19th Century. For MacIntyre, during the 17th and 18th centuries 
Thomism lost importance in secular philosophy, being replaced by Aristotelial-
ism, which maintained its place as a defender of Naturalism against Hobbesian 
egoism until Kant and Reid. 
The second difference between Irwin and MacIntyre in this epoch is their 
evaluation of the late Scholastic or Spanish Scholastic thinkers. For MacIntyre, 
the continuity of Thomism is evident in the Order of Preachers, particularly in 
the works of Vitoria and Las Casas. They developed Aquinas’ line of thinking 
on Ethics and Natural Law, rejecting other voluntaristic elements30. Neverthe-
less, Suárez synthetized voluntarism and rationalism and the Thomism’s natu-
ralistic claim was distorted. 
Unlike MacIntyre, Irwin begins his conception of Modern Ethics using an 
Aristotelian schema, identifying Suárez as a follower of the Aquinas’ and Aris-
totle’s tradition31. While Scotus and Ockham oppose the will with the rationality 
of Aquinas, Suárez represents, at the beginning of Modernity, the vindication of 
Aquinas’ legacy against the ideals of the Reformation and of the Franciscans. 
Suárez is the mise à jour of Aquinas, but his philosophy -mainly when Aquinas 
is silent- does share certain elements of voluntarism. Consequently, for Irwin 
Suárez can be placed at the origins of the Aristotelian tradition in the Modern 
Era, whereas for MacIntyre this point represents the beginning of the fall of 
Thomism.
The third difference is that MacIntyre uses but does not discuss the Histo-
riography of Ethics, while Irwin considers and reflects on it. For example, the 
volume that Irwin devotes to the Modern Era discusses at length the historio-
graphical categories of the 18th and 19th centuries.32 Particularly, he reinterprets 
the conception of Barbeyrac -the most important Ethics historian in the 1700s- 
and discusses the divisions, lineages and filiations of the great classic of Ethics 
in the 1800s: Sidgwick’s Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers 
(1886).
30 	A. MacIntyre, “Wahre Selbsterkenntnis durch Verstehen unserer selbst aus der Perspektive 
anderer”, en Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 44 (1996), 675.
31 	t.	 irwin, The Development of Ethics, vol. II, chapters 30-31. About this volume see R. 
Ramis-Barceló, “History of Modern Ethics and Rational Natural Law”, en History of European Ideas, 
36 (2010), 266-271. 
32 	a.	maCintyre, “Histories of Moral Philosophy”, 357. “In the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries episodes in the history of moral philosophy are sometimes treated not primarily in 
terms of this division into periods, but rather in terms dictated by some philosophical scheme informed 
by its author’s own larger purpose”.
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In fact, the classical historiography of Barbeyrac -as it is traditionally 
used- has explained how “the honour of emancipating Moral philosophy from 
Scholasticism belongs to Grotius”.33 Irwin rethinks these sorts of topics and 
reconstructs an Aristotelian History of Ethics: when other historians celebrate 
the emancipation from Aristotle, Irwin (and MacIntyre too) complain of the 
rejection of the Naturalism, based on eudaimonia and rationality.
Irwin shows Hobbes’s thought to be an anti-scholastic philosophy, but he 
understands that Hobbes was in debt to scholastic thought; despite this, he does 
not compare his views with the views of his predecessors. Irwin delves into the 
works of Hobbes in great detail, his main purpose being to show the incongru-
ence of his ideas: Hobbes does not posit a new method in Moral philosophy; 
nonetheless he proclaims the newness of Moral obligation to non-moral psy-
chological facts about motivation. The absence of teleology and rational Aristo-
telian psychology drives Hobbes to fail in his reduction.34 
The rest of the book elaborates on the contrast between Hobbesian tradi-
tion and the Scholastic tradition. When faced with Aquinas and Suárez, the 
Hobbesian influence shows the non-natural way, leading the rest of Modern 
Moral Philosophy to be understood as the dialectical battle between two oppos-
ing methods: the failed model of passions and the psychology of Hobbes and 
the naturalistic defence of rationality and eudaimonia.
Irwin focus his explanation on the British Moral tradition, with a discus-
sion of the categories of 19th Century Moral philosophy historians: “Selby-
Bigge divides British moralists between Hobbes and Hume into ‘sentimenta-
lists’ and ‘individualists’”.35 Irwin considers this distinction and he adds his 
unique point of view on this tradition as well as some exceptions to it. It seems 
as this particular debate occurred only in Britain, but in France, Germany and 
Italy, philosophy of very similar frameworks were also the subject of intellec-
tual dispute.36
Nonetheless, it is true that in Britain the differences between the two tradi-
tions were deeper and more representative than on the Continent. In my opin-
ion, the chapter devoted to “British moralists”37 is one of the most important in 
the book because Irwin explains the main issues in this debate: dependent vs. 
33  t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, II, o. c., 71.
34 	t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, II, o. c., 178. He sums up his considerations on Hobbes: 
“If he had succeeded in his vindicating reduction, he would have discovered the nature of moral virtues 
and our reasons for practising them, by reference to an account of human motives that does not itself 
rely on any normative non-psychological assumptions about morality or about rationality”.
35 	t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, II, o. c., 204.
36  See r.	münCH, The Ethics of Modernity, especially chapters 3-5. 
37 	t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, II, o. c., ch. 38.
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independent morality, voluntarism vs. intellectualism, rationalism vs. ortho-
doxy and rationalism vs. egoism. While in the later Medieval tradition the main 
debate was Aquinas vs. Franciscanism (rationalism vs. voluntarism), in Moder-
nity voluntarism was transformed into sentimentalism, egoism, etc. 
The Aristotelian Moral tradition has “sensitive enemies”, and Irwin 
remarks on the tensions and the metamorphosis of Aquinas’ and Scotus’ 
schemas in Modern Moral Philosophy.38 For Irwin, the explanation of Moral 
thought is the development of Naturalism versus the sensitive Psychology, and 
modern morals are a continuation of the debate between Aristotle and other 
Greek schools; Stoics vs. Epicureans, Aquinas vs. Scoto and Suárez vs. Hob-
bes. Therefore, Modern Moral Philosophy is a prolongation of the Ancient and 
Medieval discussions. However, for MacIntyre the Aristotelian framework is 
mainly present in the Scottish Enlightement39. Irwin on the other hand, leaves 
the outlines provided by Modern Aristotelian Philosophy and adds Cambridge’s 
Platonists to this line of thinking, which ends with Joseph Butler, an author who 
is not accorded much importance in MacIntyre’s works.
The fourth area of disagreement can be seen in the philosophers treatment 
of Hume. Irwin examines his ideas with serenity and respect, and he calls atten-
tion to the differences and similarities with his predecessors. The pages devoted 
to Hume are a synthesis of all the British Moral tradition and Irwin contrasts 
Hume’s Moral Philosophy with the forerunners in this area, mainly Hobbes 
and Hutcheson. One of the high points of Hume’s explanation is his analysis of 
the “is and ought” question, a central problem in subsequent ethical theory.40 In 
these pages Irwin reconstructs the roots of Hume’s philosophy and eventually 
the rational elements that he accepted.
For MacIntyre, Hume has the last philosopher that accepted Aristotelian 
Anthropology, an idea that Irwin cannot completely accept. Despite MacIn-
tyre’s personal evolution41, Hume has always been understood as an advocate 
of Naturalistic Philosophy. With Hume, despite his “Anglicizing Subversion”42, 
the Ethics based on Naturalistic Anthropology coming to an end. Following 
MacIntyre’s ideas, even Hobbes or Mandeville consider the Aristotelian man, 
but Kant configures another Anthropology based on a “trascendental subject”.
38  See the historiographical approaches in a.	PaGden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory 
in Early-Modern Europe, Cambridge, CUP, 1987. 
39  a.	maCintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, o. c., 256-259. 
40 	t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, II, o. c., 614-617.
41  See	a.	maCintyre, “Hume on «is» and «ought»”, en Against the Self-Images of the Age, 
109-124 and Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, o. c., ch. XVI.
42 	a.	maCintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, o. c., ch. XV.
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The fifth area of divergence is on Kant. Irwin’s reading of Kant is risky 
because it attempts to show how the formal system is consistent with Aristote-
lian Naturalism, though the way this is done is different. Following, inter alia, 
Grisez43, Irwin sees how in Kant the tension between natural inclination and 
obedience in recent times has pointed to a universal Teleology that develops 
the fundamental features of human beings44. Kantians say, not unreasonably, 
that the reading of Kant is forced, to the point of being excessively deformed or 
even unrecognizable.
On the one hand, Irwin, demonstrates how Kant connects with the ration-
alist line of Butler, Reid and Price, and Suárez45 in turn. On the other hand, he 
argues that Kant neither disagrees with the Stoics46 nor with the virtue ethics of 
Aristotle and Aquinas. They all indicate a final teleology pointing to the good, 
a telology that is not at all incompatible with Aristotelian Eudaimonism47. Irwin 
affirms that Kant’s criticism of Hobbes, Hutcheson and, later, Hume did not 
affect the Naturalism of classical thinkers, embodied primarily by Aquinas and 
Butler.
MacIntyre rejected the agreement between Aquinas and Kant, but in recent 
times this seems to have changed a bit48, especially in After Virtue, when Mac-
Intyre defended the non-universalizable Moral, wherein Kant was the opponent 
of Aristotelian philosophy. But when MacIntyre develops the Moral virtue and 
the necessity of founding Natural Law in practices, it is possible to find agree-
43  G.	Grisez, “Kant and Aquinas: Ethical Theory”, en J.	dunn	-	i.	Harris (ed.), Great Political 
Thinkers 4: Aquinas, Cheltenham, England, Edward Elgar, 1997, 206-240.
44 	t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, III, o. c., 48. “Morality is concerned with the interests 
of persons, and especially with the impact of actions, states of character, and so on, on the interests 
of persons. If we conceive these interests as simply the satisfaction of inclinations, apart from their 
relation to the person whose interests they are, we will endorse a utilitarian conception of the morally 
appropriate end, and suppose that we promote a person’s interest by satisfying inclinations. Kant, how-
ever, believes that rational agents care about their own interest because they are agents with a specific 
identity and specific aims apart from any particular collection of inclinations. The agents who have this 
aims, as opposed to the aims themselves, deserve respect”.
45  t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, III, o. c., 7ss.
46  t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, III, o. c., 72-74.
47  t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, III, o. c., 58. “We would be entitled to mark a sharp 
contrast between Aristotle and Kant on the place of the emotions in moral virtue if each accepted an 
extreme claim, so that (i) Kant believed that emotions have no part in virtue, and (ii) Aristotle believed 
that virtue requires the right emotions, even when they are not up to us. Neither Kant nor Aristotle, 
however, accepts the extreme claim; acceptance of it would cause serious difficulties for the rest of 
their positions. A reasonable assumption about the adaptability of emotions reconciles the Kantian and 
the Aristotelian positions”.
48  See a.	maCintyre, “Truthfulness and lies: what we can learn from Kant”, en Ethics and 
Politics, Selected Essays, (Cambridge, CUP, 2006), 122-142. l.	s.	CunninGHam (ed.): Intractable 
Disputes About the Natural Law. Alasdair MacIntyre and Critics, Indiana, Notre Dame University 
Press, 2009.
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ment between Kant and Naturalism on universalism. Natural Law is universal 
and it is the basis to solve all moral disagreements49. I think that in this way it 
is also possible to solve some aspects of the historiographical disparity between 
Irwin and MacIntyre.
Nevertheless, the problem is not only the rationality or the universality, 
but also the psychological and anthropological basis of Ethics. The Naturalis-
tic Ethics -developed on Natural Law that protects basic goods and shows the 
practices of virtue- is structured on naturalistic Psychology and Anthropology. 
MacIntyre cannot accept the trascendental basis of subject and -like Foucault- 
claims that Kant and Reid do not explain the human being as a natural creature, 
but as a ideal model. 
For Irwin, the Aristotelian tradition and Kant are partners in the same way: 
in the 18th Century Kant held the torch of reason that had sustained Aristotelia-
nism throughout the preceding centuries. And Kantianism and Aristotelianism 
are united in their opposition to their enemies. According to Irwin these are 
Machiavelli, Luther, Calvin, Montaigne, Arnauld, Gassendi, Hobbes and Man-
deville, who hold radically wrong ideas opposed to those of Suárez, Cudworth, 
Leibniz, Butler, Rousseau and others. Throughout the 19th Century, the “Kan-
tian tradition” extended from Kant to Hegel, Green and Bradley and partially to 
Sidgwick, who is associated with the Aristotelian tradition in the development 
of rational Ethics50.
For Irwin, Aristotelian Naturalism, after his marriage with Kant and Hegel 
was the unique “Rational Tradition” able to provide a voice of reason against 
irrationalism. I am afraid that MacIntyre believes Irwin adapted Aristotelian 
Naturalism to Kant’s view by lowering his expectations for Aristotelian Natu-
ralism (defined previously as the mixture of teleological eudaimonism and the 
dialectical –Socratic- method for reasonably searching for it) from the 18th to 
the 20th centuries. For MacIntyre, the exigencies of Naturalism are embodied 
in Psychology and Anthropology, and consequently from the 18th Century 
onwards he claims that there was a return to Ancient Era and the Middle Ages.
For MacIntyre, the Scottish Enlightenment has lost its characteristic ration-
ality and already holds a naturalistic conception. For example, Hutcheson or 
Hume are not rationalists like Butler or Cudworth but these four philosophers 
agree in their conception of human nature. They are naturalists in the sense that 
all have accepted that Ethics needs an evaluative judgment on the antecedents 
of human action (sentiment, passion, deliberation, and so on) while the subjec-
49  See a.	maCintyre, “Intractable Moral Disagreements”, en l.	s.	CunninGHam (ed.): Intrac-
table Disputes About the Natural Law. Alasdair MacIntyre and Critics, o. c., 20-24.
50 	t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, III, o. c., ch. 84 and 85.
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tive man does not concede any importance to these antecedents51. However, the 
relevant point here is the ideal absence of all antecedents. For subjectivists each 
action only should be motivated by the end and the obedience to categorical 
imperative for reaching it. 
Not only do the philosophers diverge on rationality, but on onother area 
as well: the sixth difference I shall comment on is their treatment of Reid. For 
MacIntyre, Reid52 is already a non-naturalist and his Ethics is based on a ideal 
subject. Even so, Irwin claims the philosophy of Reid has much in common 
with Aristotelianism53 because his Moral Philosophy is reminiscent of Latin 
Stoicism in its emphasis on the agency of the subject and self-control. Whereas 
MacIntyre eliminated the development of Moral Aristotelianism in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, Irwin understands this figure as an update to the Aristotelian 
Tradition (showing, for example, the connections with Ancient Philosophy).
Irwin is able to join Aristotelianism with Kant and this problematic union 
continues throughout the 19th Century. Hegel’s Aristotelian roots are recognised 
by both MacIntyre and Irwin. The former was quite close to Hegel when he was 
a student at the start of his academic life because he linked Hegel with Marx. 
The young MacIntyre considers Hegel and Marx capable of providing reasons 
for acting (based on historical development and political compromise)54. Actu-
ally MacIntyre deems both philosophers to be important guides to show how 
ancient societies, based on ethical harmony, lost their place in the Modern Era. 
Irwin joins the Aristotelian tradition (including Kantianism and Hegelia-
nism) to Bradley and Green who connect it with the 20th Century. Hence it is 
po ssible to reconstruct a path into 19th Century that arrives at C. I. Lewis and 
other philosophers55. In order to amplify this path, Irwin discusses the divisions, 
lineages and filiations of Sidgwick and concludes that they are not entirely 
opposed to Aristotelian Naturalism. Historiographically, while Sidgwick con-
ceived of Modernity as a stage that had surpassed the Middle Ages, which had 
tried a failed combination of Aristotle and Christianity,56 Irwin considers that 
the Socratic tradition was present in the Medieval world, and Modernity is only 
a continuation of the same problems present in the 13th and 14th centuries.
51 	a.	maCintyre, “The antecedents of Action”, en Against the Self-Images of the Age, o. c., 
191-210.
52  a.	maCintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, o. c., 325-336.
53 	t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, II, o. c., ch. 62-63.
54 	a.	maCintyre, Marxism and Christianity, New York – Duckworth – London, Schocken 
Books, 1968. See also r.	ramis-barCeló, “MacIntyre y el marxismo: Historia, compromiso y razones 
para la acción”, en Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, 43 (2011), 77-87.
55 	t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, III, o. c., chapter 89.
56  H.	sidGwiCk, Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers, o. c., 134ss.
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In Sidgwick can be found the seventh disagreement. This is because Mac-
Intyre may accept that Sidgwick is not a classical Utilitarian like Bentham, 
but Irwin rather labels him a quasi Aristotelian. MacIntyre believes Sidgwick 
is quite far from Naturalism. MacIntyre and Irwin are in greater agreement on 
the material conception of Ethics provided in The Methods of Ethics than the 
historiographical claim contained in Outlines of the History of Ethics for Eng-
lish Readers. For Irwin, Sidgwick is an eclectic who combines deontologism, 
common sense and utilitarianism, but he is not an enemy of Aristotelian Natu-
ralism57.
Both professors agree on valuing Kierkegaard in the History of Ethics as a 
proponent of the Christianism that rose out of consequentialism or the utilitar-
ian mind. However, I can find an eighth disagreement on Nietzsche. In After 
Virtue MacIntyre narrates a historiographical account of Ethics as a competi-
tion between Ancients (Aristotelians) and Moderns (the Enlightenment) and the 
referee is Nietzsche58. The German Philosopher is the judge and the competi-
tion only can be won by one of them. Irwin does not give much importance 
to Nietzsche in Ethics because the critique that he makes may be carried by 
Naturalism.
While the match according to MacIntyre is -following Hegel- a dialectical 
battle between the Ancients and Moderns59, for Irwin this combat is between 
rationalists and antirationalists (i.e. voluntarism, egoism, scepticism, etc.) And 
Nietzsche is only an irrationalist that impugned the basis of preceding Ethics 
from Socrates to Kant. To this MacIntyre replies that Aristotle and the Aristo-
telian tradition remained untouched. For MacIntyre, Nietzsche is the best critic 
of Modernity (understood as Kantianism and Utilitarianism) and Aristotelian 
tradition remains unaffected.
Both professors agree against the philosophy of Moore. MacIntyre cen-
sured Principia Ethica throughout his career and Irwin rejects Moorean ideas. 
When Irwin finishes his discussions he says that “this chapter on Moore has 
been rather negative”60. I can sum his reasons: first of all, Moore’s works are a 
non-articulated defence of utilitarianism; later, his rejections stem from the nat-
uralist fallacy and the open question argument, which are problems that Moore 
57  t.	 irwin, The Development of Ethics, III, o. c., 426. “His defence of utilitarianism rests 
partly on a detailed discussion of the morality of common sense. He intends his analysis to seem plau-
sible even to non-utilitarians, and to convince them that utilitarianism is the most plausible theoretical 
development and revision of common sense”. 
58  a.	maCintyre, After Virtue, o. c., chapter 10.
59  See also	a.	maCintyre, A Short History of Ethics, o. c., 85-86. 
60  t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, III, o. c., 661.
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cannot accurately explain. Finally Moore’s ideas are not accepted because his 
notions on Naturalism do not affect the main basis of naturalistic tradition. 
Irwin enlarges the naturalistic tradition following Green, Bradley, and 
Lewis and argues that German Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology are 
basically in agreement on Naturalism. MacIntyre appreciates Husserl’s and 
Heidegger’s viewpoints but in the 20th Century he points to the influence of 
Wittgenstein, a philosopher that Irwin does not include in Aristotelian Natural-
ism. This is the ninth disagreement between MacIntyre and his Oxford col-
league.
For Irwin, there is a convergence between Neo-Kantianism and Naturalism 
in the 20th Century61. The line concludes with Rawls, or rather with Vlastos, the 
most direct influence that Irwin has. From Vlastos, he takes the Socratic tradi-
tion and from Rawls the recuperation of practical reason from Kant. In the His-
toriography of Ethics, Irwin chooses to mix Naturalism and the Socratic vision 
of Vlastos with Rawls’ Kantianism and to maintain that these are compatible.
I have said that the ninth disagreement is on Wittgenstein. MacIntyre does 
not join the Aristotelian tradition with Kantianism. For MacIntyre, Hegel and 
Marx have a link with classical philosophy according to which they defend the 
community as opposed to the individualism of Modernity. For MacIntyre, the 
Invention of Autonomy (to make use of Schneewind’s title) is a process of indi-
vidualism that concludes with the subjectivism from Kant onwards. The best 
way to return to Naturalism is to review Thomism. For this reason, during the 
19th Century MacIntyre tries to connect the Thomist tradition of Universities 
with the Renaissance of Catholic Universities and the thought of Mercier and 
Newmann62.
Nevertheless, MacIntyre is not completely Anti-Modern because he 
searches for a line connecting Thomism (as an enriched version of Aristotelian 
Naturalism) with the mysticism that rejects deontologism and consequential-
ism; he is able to join the action with the explanation of antecedents. MacIntyre 
61 	t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, III, o. c., 891. “We have no good reason, therefore, to 
dismiss Aristotelian Naturalism from consideration. We saw that it was a mistake to dismiss it on the 
false assumption that 17th –Century science had discredited it. It would equally be a mistake to dismiss 
it on the false assumption that 20th Century meta-ethics or metaphysics has discredited it. If we review 
Aristotelian Naturalism in the light of the arguments discussed in this chapter, we find good reasons to 
take it seriously. It deserves to be regarded as a viable participant in the prolonged dialectical argument 
that Socrates began”.
62 	a.	maCintyre, God, Philosophy, Universities. A Selective History of Catholic Tradition, o. 
c., 139ss.
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unites Neo-Thomism, the Phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer 
with the philosophy of the Second Wittgenstein63.
MacIntyre follows Anscombe in her use of Wittgenstein as a link between 
Thomism and Contemporary Philosophy. Anscombe opens up the possibility 
of recovering the Aristotelian tradition according to the Second Wittgenstein, 
and MacIntyre (like Geach or Philippa Foot) brings this into this play. For Ans-
combe it is necessary to return to a naturalistic morality of virtue that has been 
substituted by duty64: Ethics should be based on natural inclinations of human 
beings; impersonal and frosty imperatives should be avoided.
Irwin is quite sympathetic to this sort of Aristotelian Naturalism but his 
conception is broader than MacIntyre’s: Irwin embraces Neo-Kantiansm for its 
recovery of practical reason, which had been forbidden from Moore to Rawls. 
A Theory of Justice recovered the importance of Ethics and it is here that Irwin 
concludes his historical journey with Rawls. This is the last point of disagree-
ment (the tenth). MacIntyre does not accept Rawls as a philosopher close to 
Aristotelian Naturalism, and throughout his works he rejects the reconstruction 
of justice by Rawls. MacIntyre claims justice is not to be the most important 
virtue and affirms that, according to Rawls, it is impossible to learn this virtue 
through a dialectical process, because justice for Rawls it is only a political 
question65.
Irwin claims Rawls deserves a place in the history of Aristotelian Natural-
ism because he agrees on some aspects with Aristotle and the Idealists66, mainly 
on his recuperation of justice. As it arrives at Rawls, the History of Ethics 
63 	a.	maCintyre, God, Philosophy, Universities. A Selective History of Catholic Tradition, o. 
c., 178. “It would be a Thomistic account in its overall understanding of truth and of our relationship 
to God as both first and final cause, but it would need to integrate into its detailed treatments of such 
topics as the limits of scientific explanation, the body-soul-mind relationship, the acquisition of self-
knowledge and the overcoming of self-deception, and the social dimensions of human activity and 
enquiry, insights, analyses, and arguments drawn from Catholic thinkers as various as Anselm and Sco-
tus, Suarez and Pascal, Stein and Marcel and Anscombe, and indeed from such seminal non-Catholic 
thinkers as Kierkegaard, Husserl, and Wittgenstein”.
64  G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern moral Philosophy”, en Philosophy, 33 (1958), 26. “Concepts 
of obligation, and duty -moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say- and of what is morally right 
and wrong, and of the moral sense of ‘ought,’ ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; 
because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no 
longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it”.
65  a.	maCintyre, “Justice: A New Theory and Some Old Questions”, en Boston University 
Law Review, 52 (1972), 330-334.
66  t.	irwin, The Development of Ethics, III, o. c., 892. “Rawls is sympathetic in certain respects 
both to Aristotle and to the idealists. His account of the good tries to show how some Aristotelian and 
idealist views can be reconciled with a firmly Kantian view that gives strict priority to the right. A dis-
cussion of this aspect of his position may help us to decide whether Green may not be right after all in 
his views about the connexions between Kantian and Aristotelian views”.
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progressively adjusts to the philosophical problems of our era. Irwin finally 
considers The Development of Ethics as the dialectical advance of rationality 
against his enemies, and Rawls confirms that practical reason has a commit-
ment to Socratic dialectic and is not the opposite of Aristotelian Naturalism.
Finally, I would say Irwin and MacIntyre agree on a non-political outlook of the 
History of Ethics. For them, a naturalistic Ethics, based on virtue and justice can 
be naturally extended to Law. For this reason, the Aristotelian Tradition does not 
observe Ethics as a sub-discipline of Politics, but as a Historical sub-discipline 
of Philosophy that leads to Natural Law. This is another area of agreement be-
tween Aristotelianism and Kant, as Irwin claims. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
I have discussed several agreements and ten areas of disagreement between 
the philosophers MacIntyre and Irwin. Their conceptions of Aristotelian 
Naturalism bear a number of similarities with each other, and from Socrates to 
Aquinas their ideas are virtually identical. Nevertheless, there are three main 
areas in which the professors are in disagreement. In sum, these are, first, the 
accumulative character of the History of Ethics; second, the dialectic Modern/
Antimodern movement in the History of Ethics; and lastly the precise nature of 
the “Aristotelian Tradition”.
Unlike MacIntyre who searches for discontinuities and disagreements 
and claims Naturalism can solve them, Irwin underscores the continuities and 
agreements throughout the History of Ethics. The Socratic tradition is a bat-
tle of rationality and dialectic against the irrationality. Finally Irwin stresses 
that throughout History a well-designed concurrence of reason has always 
appeared, as do the apology of virtues, justice and the inclinations of human 
beings against egoism, lack of consideration for others and scepticism.
For MacIntyre, Aristotelian Naturalism has an unambiguous profile that is 
not only the concurrence of reason and the importance of practices and incli-
nations of self, but also the anthropological and psychological connexions of 
Ethics. In fact, Irwin adopts a less demanding vision of Aristotelian Naturalism 
because he identifies it with the Socratic Tradition. Certainly, it is true that Aris-
totelian Naturalism is a relevant part of this Tradition, but the features of the 
Socratic tradition are not as concrete as the Aristotelian ones.
The Socratic Tradition is the development of the “capacities of rational 
nature” and the connexions between knowledge and action. And Aristotelian-
ism, according to the works of Aristotle, is most concrete in its conception of 
the human nature. Irwin defines his proposal as a mixture between the Socratic 
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Tradition and Aristotelian Naturalism because it contains a potent recipe for 
explaining the History of Ethics.
This powerful combination deserves a general agreement with great phi-
losophers of all ages. With those philosophers that are clearly Aristotelians 
(such as Aquinas, Suárez, Leibniz, Butler, etc.) Irwin emphasises their Aris-
totelian features and when they are Platonists (e.g. Augustine or Cudworth) or 
Rationalists without a clear adscription (Kant), Irwin highlights their links to 
the Socratic tradition. This is not a distortion of History by Irwin, but rather a 
soft version of Aristotelianism that aims to search for agreements throughout 
the different centuries.
In contrast, MacIntyre advocates a hard version of Aristotelianism, which 
does not conform at all to the subjectivity of the Modern Era. According to 
MacIntyre, Aristotelianism is the key to perfecting the Socratic Tradition and 
Thomism is the key to perfecting Aristotelianism. Consequently, determining 
the agreement or disagreement of a doctrine with Aristotelianism ought to be 
done by contrasting it with Thomism.
For MacIntyre, Thomism is the best development of Aristotelianism 
because it explains how human beings are and how these human beings get in 
touch with Nature better than other doctrines. Thus, Thomism is characterized 
by objectivity; the explanation of natural inclinations of human beings is the 
opposite of subjectivism or scepticism. 
This subjectivism may be disguised as voluntarism, egoism or selfish-
ness but it always develops the non-objectivity of moral judgements because 
subjectivism allows qualities such as idealism, self-interest and abstraction to 
appear. Aristotelianism is a realistic philosophy (as are Anthropology, Psycho-
logy, Biology, and others) which does not deserve to be governed by a brand 
of Ethics that divorces human beings from their natural inclinations. Aristotle 
demonstrated this ideal and Aquinas clarified it even further.
For this reason, Aristotelianism has great differences not only with Machi-
avelli or Hobbes, but also with Kant or Hegel. It is true that the Aristotelian 
Tradition cannot accept Hobbesian ideas and MacIntyre stated human beings 
can learn from Kant. Aquinas and Kant are in agreement on some topics but, 
for MacIntyre, there are more disagreements than accords; and this is a basic 
idea for developing a History of Ethics.
Finally, MacIntyre solves his problems with Modernity by partially agree-
ing with Moral Law by Kant but he is in even greater agreement with Witt-
genstein who makes a case for refusing Modernity. The Second Wittgenstein, 
combined with Phenomenology, deserves agreement with the Aristotelian tradi-
tion. For MacIntyre, agreement with Wittgenstein is easier than with Kant or 
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Idealists and in this way the relationship between Aristotelian Naturalism and 
the Modern and Contemporary Philosophy is shown.
By way of conclusion, MacIntyre and Irwin have perhaps the most power-
ful readings of the History of Ethics and they show that Aristotelian Tradition 
can successfully explain The Development of Ethics. Comparing the main 
works of both professors we can find a number of both conformities and disa-
greements that can help us to understand and discuss a complete Historiogra-
phy of Ethics. 
